Orientation To EpicureanFriends

1. ORIENTATION TO EPICUREANFRIENDS.COM - The EpicureanFriends Structure
2. Key Concepts To Understand At the Start (The Epicurean Paradigm Shift)
3. Frequently Asked Questions
4. The Major Tenets of Classical Epicurean Philosophy

1. ORIENTATION TO EPICUREANFRIENDS.COM - The EpicureanFriends Structure

The EpicureanFriends Community is a group of people who consider themselves to be friendly to the philosophy of Epicurus, and who work together to study it themselves and promote its study by others. We are volunteers working together for a common goal, not a membership organization with elected officers or other formal structure. We applaud and support those who produce books or other materials for which they may charge a fee, but EpicureanFriends itself neither solicits nor accepts donations at this time, and we have no plans to change that in the foreseeable future.

This outline provides an introduction to the way our major projects are organized, and how we see our goal of promoting "Classical Epicurean Philosophy."

1.1. The EpicureanFriends Forum

TheEpicureanFriends forum is a place for a discussion and advocacy of Epicurean philosophy. In order to participate it is necsssary to have an account, but EpicureanFriends is not itself a membership organization with elected officers, collection of money, etc.

1.2. The EpicureanFriends Handbook

The EpicureanFriends Handbook is a static website where we are building out easier access to text and support materials,

This needs updating to include the Side-By-Side Lucretius and Diogenes Laertius, and also reference to the PDFs from TauPHi and Bryan's Usener work.

1.3. The Lucretius Today Podcast

This is our weekly podcast where we go through the Epicurean texts and discuss what they mean and how to apply them to life today.

1.4. The EpicureanFriends Youtube Page

We've produced a significant number of videos which are available here.

1.5. Frequently Asked Questions And Wiki

2. Key Concepts To Understand At the Start (The Epicurean Paradigm Shift)

Note: This text contains the latest revisions to this document. The original slideshow version with audio is at YouTube here, and the original text is here. Discussion of the original version is here, and discussion of the latest updated version is here. Substack version is here.

In Book Two of his work On The Ends of Good And Evil, the Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero wrote in regard to Epicurus' view of Pleasure that:

"Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology."

Cicero - On Ends Book 2:5:16

As we will discuss, Cicero's complaint was ultimately unjustified, because there is nothing wrong with explaining how accepted understandings of things are in error and need to be changed. However Cicero was largely correct that Epicurus rejected important terminology that Cicero - and many people today - take for granted.

I have entitled this talk "The Epicurean Paradigm Shift" because the word "paradigm" is used today to refer to a general mental model or framework. A "Paradigm Shift" refers to a dramatic change in that mental model. In order for us to understand Epicurean philosophy correctly, we have to understand the mental model from which Epicurus developed his philosophy, and that presents certain challenges that we will discuss today.

For the next few minutes, what I am going to suggest to you is that Epicurean Philosophy should not be looked upon as a set of isolated positions, such as Atomism or Hedonism, but as a dramatic change in mental model covering a wide range of issues as to how to approach not only Pleasure but also important questions like the existence of gods and the nature of the universe and of the human soul.

To start with one quick example before diving deeper, let's start with the existence of "gods." This is one of the most confusing aspects of Epicurus for new readers, because almost everyone has been taught to consider Epicurus to be an atheist. When people first hear that Epicurus held that "gods" do in fact exist, they are immediately confused because they jump to the conclusion that they know what Epicurus meant by the word "gods." Some people close their mind to Epicurus as soon as they hear that Epicurus was considered an atheist, and other people close their mind as soon as they learn that Epicurus did not consider himself to be an atheist. If these people will stick with Epicurus long enough, however, they will find that Epicurus' views are much deeper than they imagine, because they will find that Epicurus rejected the common understanding of what it means to be a god in the first place.

That's one example of the terminology issues, but there are many more, and that explains a lot of the confusion that surrounds the study of Epicurus today. Just as in Epicurus' time, in our own day there are entrenched conventional positive and negative attitudes about gods, virtue, and pleasure, and many of those views are so strong that people think that no other views are possible.

So the first place to start in studying Epicurus is to open our minds to the possibility of a new paradigm of thought. Before we can decide whether we agree or disagree with Epicurus, we first have to first understand him clearly.

2.1. Evidence Of Epicurus' Embrace of New Paradigms

We do not have to rely on Cicero's complaints about Epicurus' terminology to see that there is in fact a real issue here. There are good reasons to conclude that the ancient Epicureans themselves knew that they were being misunderstood by some and misrepresented by others, and those reasons go right back to Epicurus himself, who wrote in his letter to Menoeceus:

"When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation."

Epicurus to Menoeceus, line 131.

Vatican Saying 29 records that Epicurus also said:

In investigating nature I would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob.

Epicurus, Vatican Saying 29

Likewise, in his poem on Epicurean philosophy, Lucretius warns his readers that it is necessary for them to open their minds to new possibilities. In Book Two Lucretius wrote, and here I am citing the Humphries version:

"Direct your mind
To a true system. Here is something new
For ear and eye. Nothing is ever so easy
But what, at first, is difficult to trust.
Nothing is great and marvelous, but what
All men, a little at a time, begin
To mitigate their sense of awe. Look up,
Look up at the pure bright color of the sky,
The wheeling stars, the moon, the shining sun!
If all these, all of a sudden, should arise
For the first time before our mortal sight,
What could be called more wonderful, more beyond
The heights to which aspiring mind might dare?
Nothing, I think. And yet, a sight like this,
Marvelous as it is, now draws no man
To lift his gaze to heaven's bright areas.
We are a jaded lot. But even so
Don't be too shocked by something new, too scared
To use your reasoning sense, to weigh and balance,
So that if in the end a thing seems true,
You welcome it with open arms; if false,
You do your very best to strike it down."

- Lucretius Book 2:1023 (Humphries)

Another recorded example of Epicurus's unusual phrasing is found in the work "Attic Nights" by the second-century AD Roman writer Aulus Gellius.

Plutarch, in the second book of his essay On Homer, asserts that Epicurus made use of an incomplete, perverted and faulty syllogism, and he quotes Epicurus's own words: "Death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved is without perception, and what is without perception is nothing to us." "Now Epicurus," says Plutarch, "omitted what he ought to have stated as his major premise, that death is a dissolution of body and soul, and then, to prove something else, he goes on to use the very premise that he had omitted, as if it had been stated and conceded. But this syllogism," says Plutarch, "cannot advance, unless that premise be first presented."

What Plutarch wrote as to the form and sequence of a syllogism is true enough; for if you wish to argue and reason according to the teaching of the schools, you ought to say: "Death is the dissolution of soul and body; but what is dissolved is without perception; and what is without perception is nothing to us." But we cannot suppose that Epicurus, being the man he was, omitted that part of the syllogism through ignorance, or that it was his intention to state a syllogism complete in all its members and limitations, as is done in the schools of the logicians; but since the separation of body and soul by death is self-evident, he of course did not think it necessary to call attention to what was perfectly obvious to everyone. For the same reason, too, he put the conclusion of the syllogism, not at the end, but at the beginning; for who does not see that this also was not due to inadvertence?

In Plato too you will often find syllogisms in which the order prescribed in the schools is disregarded and inverted, with a kind of lofty disdain of criticism.

In the same book, Plutarch also finds fault a second time with Epicurus for using an inappropriate word and giving it an incorrect meaning. Now Epicurus wrote as follows: "The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of everything that pains." Plutarch declares that he ought not to have said "of everything that pains," but "of everything that is painful"; for it is the removal of pain, he explains, that should be indicated, not of that which causes pain. In bringing this charge against Epicurus Plutarch is "word-chasing" with excessive minuteness and almost with frigidity; for far from hunting up such verbal meticulousness and such refinements of diction, Epicurus hunts them down.

Aulus Gellius - Attic Nights

2.2. The "Pleasure" Paradigm Shift

Before we go further and tackle anything else, let's go back to Cicero and lock in this terminology issue as to Pleasure, since pleasure is the topic most people associate with Epicurus and are most interested in. In section 23 of Book 2 of On Ends, Cicero, who is an Academic Skeptic and very hostile to Epicurus, is speaking with Torquatus, an Epicurean. Cicero lets his exasperation and sarcasm for Epicurean philosophy come through here, so this is very revealing. Cicero says this:

The name of pleasure certainly has no dignity in it, and perhaps we do not exactly understand what is meant by it; for you are constantly saying that we do not understand what you mean by the word pleasure: no doubt it is a very difficult and obscure matter. When you speak of atoms, and spaces between worlds, things which do not exist, and which cannot possibly exist, then we understand you. Cannot we understand what pleasure is, a thing which is known to every sparrow? What will you say if I compel you to confess that I not only do know what pleasure is (for it is a pleasant emotion affecting the senses), but also that I know what you mean by the word? For at one time you mean by the word the very same thing which I have just said (which is a pleasant emotion affecting the senses), and you give it the description of consisting in motion, and of causing some variety. At another time you speak of some other highest pleasure, which is susceptible of no addition whatever, but that it is present when every sort of pain is absent, and you call it then a "state," not a "motion." Let that, then, be pleasure.

Say, in any assembly you please, that you do everything with a view to avoid suffering pain. If you do not think that this language is sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently honorable, say that you will do everything during your year of office, and during your whole life, for the sake of your own advantage; that you will do nothing except what is profitable to yourself, nothing which is not prompted by a view to your own interest. What an uproar such a declaration would excite in the assembly, and what hope do you think you would have of the consulship? Can you follow principles, which when you are alone or with your closest friends you do not dare to profess and avow openly?

But instead, you have those maxims constantly in your mouth which the Peripatetics and Stoics profess! In the courts of justice and in the senate you speak of duty, equity, dignity, good faith, uprightness, honorable actions, conduct worthy of power, worthy of the Roman people; you talk of encountering every imaginable danger in the cause of the republic — of dying for one's country. When you speak in this manner we are all amazed, like a pack of blockheads. And you are laughing in your sleeve: for, among all those high-sounding and admirable expressions, pleasure has no place, not only that pleasure which you say consists in motion, and which all men, whether living in cities or in the country, all men, in short, who speak Latin, call pleasure, but even that stationary pleasure, which no one but your sect calls pleasure at all.

Cicero, On Ends 2:23

Here we see Cicero saying that Epicurus has a concept of pleasure "which no one but your sect calls pleasure at all."

We need to get to the bottom of that, so let's follow Cicero just a little further to see what this dispute is all about, because what we are going to find is that Epicurus held that all experiences in life - all experiences in life - fall within one of two feelings, either pleasure or pain, and Cicero refuses to accept that division.

Cicero told his Epicurean friend Torquatus that Epicurus' application of the term pleasure in this way

… does violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued. For who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; and thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain….

Cicero, On Ends 2:16

Here we have the crux of the issue, not only between Cicero and Torquatus, but between Epicurus and the rest of the philosophic world. Cicero is saying that there are states which do not constitute pleasure or pain, and Epicurus is saying that that is not true - that there are only pleasure and pain. Epicurus is saying that if you are alive, and feeling anything at all, you are feeling one or the other - pleasure or pain.

And what I have just said there is almost an exact quote from Torquatus. In Section 38 of On Ends Book One, Torquatus said to Cicero,

"Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition is necessarily either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.

Torquatus - Cicero, On Ends 1:38

We could dedicate the rest of the time we have today to explaining that position further, but what I want to emphasis most of all is this:

Epicurus holds that death is nothing to us, which means there is no life after death, and that means that all the happiness we are ever going to experience must occur in this single life that we have. Most all of the supposed great thinkers of the world, like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, were dedicated to some form of supernatural creation of the universe, which implies that humans are special beings with eternal souls which can continue to exist in some form after death. From Epicurus' perspective, this life is our most valuable possession and something to be enjoyed, so it makes perfect sense that we should consider every experience of life which is not painful to be pleasurable. You can decide for yourself whether you agree with Epicurus' terminology, but from this perspective it makes perfect sense to divide everything in life between that which is desirable, and call it pleasure, and that which is undesirable, and call it pain. Between those two there is no middle ground, and those who reject this division are saying more about themselves, and their own inferior view of life, than they are saying about Epicurus.

As a result of this perspective, when we look at Venus as a representation of Pleasure and Nature, as Lucretius did at the opening of his poem, we are not looking only at stimulative pleasure - the sex drugs and rock and roll of life. We are also looking at Venus as the representation of every desirable aspect of human life, mental and physical, from philosophy to sports to art to literature to music to history, from passionate love and affection to simple contemplation, and to every mental and physical activity of life in between that is not painful.

Cicero and other opponents of Epicurus strongly reject this expansion in the use of the word pleasure. In Section 7 of Book One of On Ends, Cicero tried to make an end-run around Epicurus by arguing that Epicurus never made the claim that Pleasure includes all of the mental and physical activities that I just listed. Cicero argued,

What actual pleasure do you, Torquatus, or does Triarius here, derive from literature, from history and learning, from turning the pages of the poets and committing vast quantities of verse to memory? Do not tell me that these pursuits are in themselves a pleasure to you, and that so were the deeds I mentioned of the Torquati. That line of defense was never taken by Epicurus or Metrodorus, nor by any one of them if he possessed any intelligence or had mastered the doctrines of your school.

Cicero, On Ends 1:7

Of all the arguments made by Cicero against Epicurus, this is one of the most patently absurd. Are we to believe that there is no pleasure to be found in literature, history, poetry, and other learning? Cicero could hardly believe that Torquatus would accept this claim, and indeed Torquatus rejects it implicitly over and over again when given the chance.

No, this claim by Cicero is absurd, and there's an important lesson to be learned when an experienced trial lawyer like Cicero is willing to risk his own credibility by going over the top with an argument that no one with any knowledge of Epicurus would believe. What Cicero is doing is making an argument that is patently false, and instead of accepting Epicurus' view of pleasure and disagreeing on the merits, Cicero tries to ridicule Epicurus, throughout his book, by calling Epicurus's position effeminate and cowardly and disreputable. Rather than dealing honestly with ideas, Cicero is deflecting our attention and asking us to consider whether any normal, proud, strong, and vigorous man or woman would possibly accept "absence of pain" as the goal of their lives.

The answer to that, is of course they would not, given Cicero's definition of pleasure as limited to sensual stimulation. But that's not the definition of pleasure that Epicurus stated, or the Epicureans were working with. And that's something that Cicero, and people who think like Cicero, refuse to acknowledge.

This is an important question that demands a response, but Cicero controlled the terms of the debate in On Ends, and he never gave Torquatus the opportunity to address it in detail. Cicero was counting on the fact that - just like today - many people do in fact jump to the conclusion that "pleasure" means "sensual stimulation" only, because they have not heard the full Epicurean explanation of Pleasure. Just as Epicurus complained to Menoeceus, it is very easy for Epicurus' enemies to deceive and say that when Epicurus speaks of pleasure all he means is bodily stimulation.

Why would Cicero take such a risk in making an argument that can be easily refuted, and which the information in Cicero's own book refutes? Because Epicurus's enemies, from the Stoics, to Cicero, to Plutarch, and on to the Jews and the Christians who came afterward, totally reject Epicurus's view that there are no supernatural gods. Epicurus's enemies promote piety to the gods or Virtue or Reason as the organizing principles of life, and they know that what Epicurus taught meant the total rejection of their own principles of life.

In educating people to what Pleasure really means, and showing them how a life of pleasure can in fact be achieved, Epicurus was leading a philosophical and moral revolution. Cicero rightly saw that the continued spread of Epicurean philosophy would have spelled the end of supernatural-based ethis in the educated world.

Norman DeWitt, the Canadian Professor who authored the book Epicurus And His Philosophy, expressed what Epicurus was doing in this way:

“The extension of the name of pleasure to the normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

Norman DeWitt - Epicurus and His Philosophy, p. 240

2.3. The "Absence of Pain" Paradigm Shift

Before we move on, let's say a little more about the paradigm shift involved in "absence of pain."

Today, this term is often misinterpreted as Epicurus abandoning the normal active and stimulating mental and bodily pleasures in favor of a Buddhist-like or Stoic-like indifference, or aloofness, or asceticism. This could not be further from the truth. As we have already discussed, Epicurus held that there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain. When there are only two options of anything, then the absence of one equals the presence of the other.

One way to think of this is as a Pie chart divided by a line into two parts, with one side representing pleasure and the other representing pain. No matter how you draw the dividing line, everything on one side of the line is pleasure, and the other is pain. The part of the chart that is not pain - where pain is absent - is therefore pleasure, and vice versa. In this paradigm, the term "absence of pain" means nothing more, or less, than "Pleasure."

In this way we see what Cicero refused to admit: that the term "absence of pain" does not indicate a special or higher type of pleasure, but pleasure itself, in any of the many active or stable forms in which it can exist. Dividing all of experience into the two categories of pleasure and pain in this way does not tell us what type of pleasure or pain is involved in a particular life at a particular moment, but it does tell us that in general, we want as much of our experience to be pleasurable, and as little of our experience to be painful, as possible.

Epicurus' enemies, and even many who profess to be his friend but who are or more of Stoic or Ascetic bent, have turned this perspective on its head, and ended up making it look like the primary goal of Epicurean philosophy is to run like a coward from every moment of pain no matter how slight. Again, nothing could be further from the truth. Epicurus clearly tells us that we will regularly choose activities that are painful, when those activities increase our total pleasure, and that in fact the cowardly and shameful person is he who always chooses pleasure even when he or she should see that that choice will lead ultimately to disaster.

Nothing could be more clear than Torquatus' explanation of this:

… [[W]e denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided.

But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pain.

Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends Book 1:10

By now in my talk it is clear that even though Cicero was a strong critic of Epicurus, we have much to thank Cicero for, because Cicero preserved for much detail about Epicurean arguments that would otherwise be lost. And those who read the letter to Menoeceus over and over again without the illustrations that Torquatus provides are doing themselves a major disservice.

Possibly the most important illustration that Cicero preserved through Torquatus is a story about an argument made against Epicurus by the famous Stoic philosopher Chrysippus.

The argument strikes many of us as strange the first time we hear it, but if you'll stay with me I think you'll see something very important. Here's the story Torquatus told in Section 11 of Book One of On Ends, and it involves Chrysippus holding out his hand, and making a short logical argument to an unknown person who apparently does not understand Epicurus.

Here's the story:

"At Athens, so my father used to tell me when he wanted to air his wit at the expense of the Stoics, in the Ceramicus there is a statue of Chrysippus seated and holding out one hand, the gesture being intended to indicate the delight which Chrysippus used to take in the following little syllogism:

“Does your hand want anything, while it is in its present condition?”

“No, nothing.”

“But if pleasure were a good, it would want pleasure.”

“Yes, I suppose it would.”

“Therefore pleasure is not a good.”

This is an argument, my father declared, which not even a statue would employ, if a statue could speak; because though it is cogent enough as an objection to the Cyrenaics, it does not touch Epicurus. For if the only kind of pleasure were that which so to speak tickles the senses, an influence permeating them with a feeling of delight, neither the hand, nor any other part of the body, could be satisfied with the absence of pain unaccompanied by an agreeable and active sensation of pleasure.

Whereas if, as Epicurus holds, the highest pleasure be to feel no pain, Chrysippus's interlocutor, though justified in making his first admission (that his hand in that condition wanted nothing) was not justified in his second admission (that if pleasure were a good, his hand would have wanted it).

And the reason why it would not have wanted pleasure is that to be without pain is to be in a state of pleasure.

Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends 1:11

What does this mean? Again, this can be confusing, as the Stoics like to be. We don't normally think about our hands in their normal condition wanting or lacking pleasure or anything else. But thinking about that is the key to understanding the analogy and why Chrysippus's point is false. Chrysippus was presuming that we would agree with him, and in fact we do, that if a thing is the highest good for a living thing, then any living thing that lacks that thing will want it, and be dissatisfied, or even in pain, from the lack of it.

Just like Cicero is doing, Chryssipus is trying to get us to accept that the only type of pleasure is sensual stimulation, and in fact Torquatus points out for us that that is exactly what Aristippus, and the Cyreniacs, did in fact believe. In other words if the only kind of pleasure that exists for our hand is that of being massaged, or being immersed in a warm bath, then if the goal of life is pleasure then our hands would be satisfied unless they were constantly being massaged or warmed. Cicero and the Stoics are both saying that if Pleasure is the goal of life, and Pleasure consists only in stimulation, no living being, whether a hand or a full person, could ever be satisfied, and thus it would be in pain, unless it had sensual stimulation.

And of course the enemies of Epicurus also want you to focus on the fact - with which Epicurus agrees - that sensual stimulation is not something you can expect to be constant and uninterrupted for your whole life. So therefore they want you to conclude that considering Pleasure to be the goal of life and the highest good is not only disreputable but a fool's errand that is doomed to failure.

The Epicurean response to this is very clear, and Torquatus gives it:

Under Epicurus' sweeping view of pleasure, the defoault position of simply being alive in a healthy state is pleasurable. Whether we are talking about our hand or any other living thing, if we are not experiencing pain and we are in a normal and healthy state then what we are experiencing is pleasure. And even when we may be experiencing physical pain, Torquatus makes clear that physical pain can be outweighed by mental pleasure. Torquatus says this:

This therefore clearly appears, that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration. But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: and this fact serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.

Torquatus - Cicero, On Ends Book 1:18

As we will mention later, the story of Epicurus being happy even while in great physical pain on the last day of his life makes this same point. So far is Epicurus from valuing only bodily pleasures, that he emphasized using his own example that mental pleasures are frequently of much greater importance to us than are bodily ones.

This view of pleasure does in fact reject the terminology that Cicero and the rest of the philosophers insist on using. However as Norman Dewitt said, this change in paradigm is fully justified, and humanity would be far better off by recognizing and reasoning that Epicurus's approach to pleasure is correct.

And what could be more true than to observe that when the total experience of the hand, or a person as a whole, is without any pain, than that the total experience is the highest amount of pleasure possible? Such an experience is pure pleasure with no mixture of pain, and fully justifies the label of "the highest pleasure," even if we are not specifying whether the person is sitting calmly at rest or rocketing himself to Mars to experience the exhilaration of exploration. Both of these examples, or any example in which it is stated that no pain is present, are rightly considered to be "the highest pleasure." Cicero in fact provides later in the same work just such an example, which left Cicero astounded, that the Epicureans could consider both the host at a banquet who is without pain but pouring wine for a guest, as experiencing the same amount of pleasure as the thirsty guest who is relieving his thirst and is also otherwise without pain.

The point of that story as well, is that if it is stated that you are without pain, then you are without pain, and at the theoretical peak of pleasure.

We frequently hear the objection "How can absence of pain be the "peak" of Pleasure?" Here we can look back to both the words and the life of Epicurus for guidance on how much pleasure a person should seek.

In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus tells us repeatedly that the goal of life is pleasure, and that we should the most pleasant life, but Epicurus does notseek to substitute his judgment for ours as to what each person will be find to be most pleasant life for them.

Just as with food the wise man does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy to the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

…

Independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it. …

Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus

Epicurus tells Menoeceus that "every pleasure because of its natural kinship to us is good," but that some pleasures are not to be chosen because in the end they do bring more pain than pleasure. Epicurus tells everyone in Principal Doctrine 10 that:

If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires and of pains, we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 10

All of those point in the same direction, that Epicurus is not going to tell us what is the most pleasurable life for us. He's going to let Nature tell us that, directly, given the circumstances of our own lives. Epicurus is a philosopher, not a life coach, and as you would expect from a philosopher who rejects the idea of a central supernatural plan for the universe as a whole, Epicurus generally writes in broad philosophic terms that are appropriate for someone who realizes that our specific personal circumstances will generally control what we find to be most pleasant and most painful for us. Epicurus always tracks his underlying premises about the nature of the universe, and therefore when each of us reaches the end of our lives, whenever that may be, it is only we ourselves - and no supernatural god or anyone else - whose opinion counts as to whether we have made the best use of our lives.

In Epicurus' own case, we have the biography of Diogenes Laertius as evidence that Epicurus was far from choosing a life of minimalism or asceticism for himself. Few men who choose a life of asceticism have any need to write a will disposing of extensive personal property, but Epicurus' will shows us that at the time of his death Epicurus held not only the "garden" that is associated with his name, Epicurus held also a house in Milete, which appears to have generated income sufficient for a number of purposes, including caring for the son of Metrodorus, for the son of Polyaenus, and for the daughter of Metrodorus. Epicurus also appears to have held at least four slaves, whom he freed at his death, and possibly a larger number that he did not. To the example of Epicurus we can also point to Diogenes of Oinoanda, who was well off enough at the end of his life to endow a large public monument dedicated to Epicurus. We can also look to other Epicureans such as Cicero's friend Atticus or Philodemus' patron Piso, all of whom were very wealthy. These are not the markings of men who believed that Epicurean philosophy pointed them toward any form of asceticism or minimalism.

Epicurus regularly challenges us to think outside the box by using phrases such as "death is nothing to us," or "the size of the sun is as it appears to be." The use of terminology that equates Pleasure with "Absence of Pain" is not only challenging but it is also maddening to those people like Cicero who refuse to accept any other way of thinking than their own. But in the end, stating proudly that the goal of life is "Absence of Pain" is just as aggressive - just as confrontational - and just as correct - as stating that the goal of life is Pleasure.

Cicero tried to argue Torquatus down from this position, but Torquatus stood his ground without hesitation.

At Section 9 of Book 2 of On Ends, Cicero argued:

“…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'”

Torquatus replied:

“Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for the fact that freedom from pain means pleasure is as true as any proposition can be.”

Cicero On Ends 2:9

Some who resist Epicurus' view of pleasure will say that he is playing a word game, and that on most occasions our immediate experience is a combination of pleasures and pains. But Epicurus himself provides the example that in proves the rule of what he was asserting.

As Diogenes Laertius records:

When he was on the point of death Epicurus wrote the following letter to Idomeneus: ‘On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you. Do, as I might expect from your devotion from boyhood to me and to philosophy, take good care of the children of Metrodorus.

Diogenes Laertius 10:22

So on the last day of his life, Epicurus was experiencing both severe bodily pain and mental pleasure at the thought of his philosophical achievements and the company of his friends. Nevertheless, Epicurus wrote that this last day of his life was also among his happiest.

Epicurus knew that because we are humans must expect a combination of pleasures and pains. As Torquatus explains for us Epicurean philosophy gives us the key to understanding that it is within our power to live a life in which pleasure predominates.

As Torquatus explained in Section 62 of Book One of On Ends:

For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.

Torquatus - Cicero, On Ends 1:62

If this analysis of "Absence of Pain" is correct, it would be nice to find some ancient authority making the same point outside of Cicero's work. We can cite at least one instance of this in the previously-mentioned work of Aulus Gellius. In addition to defending Epicurus' non-standard use of logical phrasing as to death, Gellius provides us no less an example than Homer himself as someone who emphasized the height of something by referring to it as the extreme point of its opposite. Here is the text, again from "Attic Nights," where Gellius gives examples of this device and says that Epicurus was using it himself as to "absence of pain."

There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari). And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb:

Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose.

But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as "freedom from all reproach" makes one inculpatus (blameless).

Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example:

“And not unwillingly they charged,”

and again:

“Not then would you divine Atrides see Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight.”

Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words: “The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains.”

Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool “unlovely.” For just as he expressed abhorrence of the “unpraised” man by the denial of praise, so he abhorred the “unlovable” by the denial of love.

Attic Nights 2:6

So in this example we can see that we need not consider "absence of pain" to be a new paradigm at all. If Homer can "usually bestow high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults, then Epicurus is perfectly within his rights to use "absence of pain" as the "height of pleasure." Using Gellius' phrasing and applying it to pleasure and pain, we can begin to make this phrasing more familiar to us be seeing that just as "absence of pain" is the synonym for perfect pleasure, therefore conversely "absence of pleasure" represents the limit of extreme pain.

For those who have not thought about this wording beforehand, it might not be advisable to surprise your romantic partner by telling him or her that they represent "absence of pain" to you. But figuring problems like this out is exactly what Epicurean philosophy requires of us, and indeed Epicurus is noted by Norman DeWitt to have said just that:

To substantiate this drift of reasoning it is not impossible to quote a text:

The stable condition of well-being in the flesh and the confident hope of its continuance means the most exquisite and infallible of joys for those who are capable of figuring the problem out.

DeWitt page 233, citing Usener 68.

2.4. The "Gods" Paradigm Shift

At this point I have used up most of my time, but let me quickly mention several more paradigm shifts, turning next to the second most important of them all.

As we've already mentioned, people today or conditioned to think that you either believe in a supernatural god or you are an atheist. Almost everyone today thinks of gods as omnipotent and omniscient and omnipresent – all sorts of "omni" supernatural characteristics – and they think if you reject those characteristics you're rejecting the very possibility of there being a god of any kind.

The truth is that Epicurus held neither of those positions. Epicurus held that divine beings do exist, but that divine beings are an absolutely natural part of our universe, just like everything else, and certainly not supernatural. Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus:

For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many.

Epicurus's Letter to Menoeceus

Epicurus held that to be a god means to be totally happy, and totally without worry of anything, including death. Epicurean gods may be at the top of "successful living" pyramid, but Epicurean gods are in no way supernatural. Epicurean gods do not create universes or in any way meddle in the affairs of human beings, any more than we generally take it upon ourselves to go looking to cause trouble for ants.

Because gods are totally natural and take no notice of us, we as humans have absolutely no reason to fear them. And to the extent that the subject of gods should cross our minds at all, it should be as a part of our understanding that the universe contains infinite amounts of life, and that it is helpful to us to consider how a totally happy being who is totally unconcerned about death might live. Epicurus famously stated that it is possible through the study of philosophy to live like a "god among men," and Lucretius repeated the analogy in comparing the blessedness of Epicurus' life to that of a god.

This view of divinity is not atheism as we use that word today, but it totally eliminates the need to be concerned about controlling or angry or loving gods as suggested by many religions and philosophies. And more than that, it helps us focus on the fact that just as with any gods that exist, we too are a part of Nature and not the focus of attention of some arbitrary supernatural god.

2.5. The "Virtue" Paradigm Shift

Turning quickly to Virtue,in contrast to the Stoics Epicurus denied that virtue is an end in itself, or the same for all people at all times and at all places. Epicurus held the general term for the true goal of life is Pleasure, and that virtue is a tool - inseparable and necessary - that we need for living pleasurably.

Most people in Epicurus's age and even today angrily reject this viewpoint, but it is the logical conclusion of identifying that there can be only one "greatest" good in life. Remember, Epicurus is a philosopher, and what he is trying to do is to give you a framework through which you can think your way out of the box that the other philosophers and religions want to keep you inside.

This issue became such a major question with the rise of Stoicism that the Epicurean Diogenes of Oinoanda had to resort to "shouting" about it on the wall that he erected to celebrate the benefits of Epicurean philosophy. Diogenes wrote about those who have views similar to Stoicism on his wall in what we now have as Fragment 32:

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into "what is the means of happiness?" and they wanted to say "the virtues" (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not "what is the means of happiness?" but "what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?," I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks alike, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, fragment 32

2.6. The "Death" Paradigm Shift

Turning next to Epicurus' famous statement, "Death Is Nothing To Us" - this is a statement that derives from Epicurus' conclusion in the field of Physics that human consciousness ceases to exist when the body dies. Because we no longer exist, it is impossible for us to receive after death any reward or punishment for anything that we do in this life, or to have any consciousness whatsoever.

Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus:

Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living.

Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus

This doesn't mean of course that we should not be concerned about the welfare of our friends after we die, or the time and manner of our own death. Epicurus taught that life is desirable, and a painful death is certainly undesirable. When we realize that our time is limited, that helps us to relish the time that we do have, and it even motivates us to provide for the future of our friends who will live after us, just as Epicurus himself left a will and provided for his school and for the daughter of Metrodorus after his own death.

Epicurus didn't cavalierly refuse to think about death, and neither should we. Epicurus taught that what is important is to realize that after we die we no longer exist forever, and that is a state of nothingness in which we will have no pain or pleasure of any kind. For that reason the old expression applies about making use of your time, "make hay while the sun shines."

2.7. The "Reality" Paradigm Shift

Another poorly-understood phrase often associated with Epicurean philosophy is that "nothing exists except atoms and void." This a view that originated with Democritus rather than Epicurus, and Epicurus was emphatic in separating himself from the conclusions that some draw from it. To say that all things are composed of atoms and void does not mean that the things we see around us are not real, and it does not lead to skepticism or nihilism, as it seems to have done, at least to some extent, for Democritus himself. Epicurus was emphatic in pointing out the mistakes of Democritus' conclusions.

Professor David Sedley, one of the great experts on Epicurus today, explains the point this way in his article entitled "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism:"

"Because phenomenal objects and properties [the things we see around us] seemed to reduce to mere configurations of atoms and void, Democritus was inclined to suppose that the atoms and void were real while the phenomenal objects and properties were no more than arbitrary constructions placed upon them by human cognitive organs. In his more extreme moods, Democritus was even inclined to doubt the power of human judgment, since judgment itself was no more than a realignment of atoms in the mind.

Epicurus' response to this is perhaps the least appreciated aspect of his thought. It was to reject reductionist atomism. Almost uniquely among Greek philosophers, [Epicurus] arrived at what is nowadays the unreflective assumption of almost anyone with a smattering of science, that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter; but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth. The truth that sugar is sweet is not straightforwardly reducible to the truth that it has such and such a molecular structure, even though the latter truth may be required in order to explain the former. By establishing that cognitive skepticism, the direct outcome of reductionist atomism, is self-refuting and untenable in practice, Epicurus justifies his non-reductionist alternative, according to which sensations are true and there are therefore bona fide truths at the phenomenal level accessible through them.

-David Sedley, "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism"

In other words, while nothing has an eternal and unchanging nature except the atoms and the void and the universe a whole, we ourselves - and the things we see around us - everything we love, from our dogs, to our cats, to our houses, to everything around us that we see and touch every day - those things are real too. It's very damaging to think that these things are somehow less real than the atoms and the void, because what that often leads to is the idea that only the atoms and void are real, and that everything else is a figment of our imagination, and that leads to nihilism and helplessness which is the furthest thing from Epicurean Philosophy possible.

Now we are accelerating towards our close with just a few more comments:

2.8. The "Worlds" Paradigm Shift

For Epicurus the term "World" refers not just to the Earth, but to all that we see in the sky as well, including the sun, the moon, the stars, and the planets. And in an infinite universe, there are infinite number of worlds. Lucretius says it this way in Book Two of his poem.

If there is so great a store of seeds as the whole life of living things could not number, and if the same force and nature abides which could throw together the seeds of things, each into their place in like manner as they are thrown together here, you must confess that there are other worlds in other regions, and diverse races of men and tribes of wild beasts. In the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this direction is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this direction the stock of men, in this direction again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.

Lucretius, Book 2:1067

So when you read the word "World," Epicurus tells us that there are an infinite number of worlds, other collections of planets and stars and galaxies and living beings.

Epicurus held that because Nature never creates only a single thing of a kind, we expect there to be innumerable worlds in the universe where life both similar and different from ours exists.

So that here on Earth as humans, we are not by any means the only, or the most intelligent, life that exists in the universe, nor are we the center of the universe, or the center of attention of a god that chooses certain peoples to be his friends and others to be his enemies.

Views such as that are totally irreconcilable with Epicurean philosophy.

2.9. The "Truth" Paradigm Shift

Also - when you read Epicurus you'll often see references to a "Canon of Truth," and you need to understand that this does not refer to a book of propositions like a rulebook or a Bible, but to a "test" of truth, similar to a ruler or a yardstick by which we measure distance. A ruler can be applied to any object to measure its size, but it tells us nothing more about that object other than how it compares to a known quantity. For example, a ruler tells us that both a human foot and a football are approximately a foot long, but the ruler does not tell us the nature of a human foot or a football or that they are very different things.

Epicurus' biographer Diogenes Laertius explains the Canon of Truth this way:

Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and the preconceptions and the feelings…. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to or take from it.

Diogenes Laertius Book 10:31

For Epicurus the ultimate test of reality is not syllogisms or abstract logic, but whether a thing can be felt or measured when tested by the faculties given us by nature, including the five senses, the intuitive faculty known as "preconception," or the feeling of pleasure and pain.

Because these faculties are given to us by Nature, it is they to which we look to validate all our reasoning, and so from that perspective "all sensations are true." These natural faculties have no memory or reasoning of their own, and they never lie to us, so everything that they report to us has to be accounted for if we want to fill in the picture of whatever they are reporting to us.

Error can certainly take place in our reasoning about what the senses report to us, but the senses themselves never lie - they simply report what they receive without any added opinion of their own, and it is up to us in our mind to process that result.

2.10. The "Epicurus" Paradigm Shift

I only have time for one more paradigm shift before we close, but I'd like to suggest that this can be the most important. In the end, the most life-changing paradigm shift that can come from the study of Epicurus is to see that Epicurus is not the philosopher of shy retiring ascetic wallflowers who avoid engagement with the world and who seek only quiet, simplicity, minimalism, and even austerity, as some people would have you to believe.

Once you understand the Epicurean view of life, you will see that Epicurus is the philosopher of people who are healthy, active, and vigorously alive, and who understand that life is short, and that we should work as hard as we can to make the best of the time that we have while we are alive.

As stated in Vatican Saying 47, an Epicurean will seize the day and approach life aggressively:

I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And I will not give myself up as captive to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.

Epicurus, Vatican Saying 47

In the ancient world Epicurus appealed to large numbers of people, but the followers of Epicurus who you are almost never told about include Roman generals such as Cassius Longinus, Gaius Panza, and other leaders of Julius Caesar's camp, quite possibly including Julius Caesar himself, who at the very least held a number of very Epicurean ideas. These men led full and active lives, vigorously engaged with the world around them.

Once again we can thank Cicero for the preservation of an important Epicurean text. In 45 BC, in the middle of the Roman Civil War, Cassius Longinus tried to explain Epicurean philosophy to Cicero. We have Cassius's letter in which he wrote to Cicero the following:

"It is hard to convince men that "the good is to be chosen for its own sake;" but that pleasure and tranquility of mind is acquired by virtue, justice, and the good is both true and demonstrable. Why, Epicurus himself, from whom all the Catiuses and Amafiniuses in the world, incompetent translators of terms as they are, derive their origin, lays it down that "to live a life of pleasure is impossible without living a life of virtue and justice." Consequently Pansa, who follows pleasure, keeps his hold on virtue, and those also whom you call pleasure-lovers are lovers of what is good and lovers of justice, and cultivate and keep all the virtues."

Cassius To Cicero, January, 45 BC

We'll never know whether Cicero truly had a change of heart about Epicurean philosophy at the very end of his life, but we do know that Cicero admitted to Cassius that Cassius' actions had made him reevaluate his attitude toward Epicurus.

Near the end of his life Cicero wrote this to Cassius:

" …[T]o whom am I talking? To you, the most gallant gentleman in the world, who, ever since you set foot in the forum, have done nothing but what bears every mark of the most impressive distinction. Why, in that very school you have selected I apprehend that there is more vitality than I should have supposed, if only because it has your approval."

Cicero To Cassius, January, 45 BC

For those of us who are alive today, we have the chance that Cicero missed to look further into Epicurean philosophy and see how it can shift our own understanding of the universe and our place in it.

The next step in the study of Epicurus is up to you. As Lucretius said at Book one line 398 of his poem to the student of Epicurean philosophy:

"For as dogs often discover by smell the lair of a mountain-ranging wild beast, though covered over with leaves, when once they have got on the sure track, thus you in cases like this will be able by yourself alone to see one thing after another and find your way into all dark corners and draw forth the truth."

Lucretius 1:398 (Munro)

2.11. Closing Words

As we close now, if there is anything that I would impress on your mind about what we have discussed, it is this:

Don't presume that Epicurus is speaking to you the way everyone else does. Read back into the original texts, not only from Diogenes Laertius and Diogenes of Oinoanda and Lucretius, but also from Cicero's On Ends and other reputable authorities. Sometimes even Epicurus' enemies understand him better than do some of his self-styled friends.

To help you get there the fastest and with the broadest perspective, I recommend Norman DeWitt's Epicurus and His Philosophy. If you are not already familiar with Greek philosophy, you will probably want to start with DeWitt before you read anything else.

Above all, don't let the Greek words or the non-standard terminology intimidate you. As Epicurus himself suggested, put everything into an outline so you can see the big and consistent picture and how it impacts the separate doctrines, especially the most important ones about gods, and death, and pleasure.

Don't look for mystical meaning behind phrasing you don't understand - above all as to "absence of pain." In the end, as Cicero also said, Epicurean philosophy is simple and straightforward. There are no supernatural gods. There is no life after death. There are no absolute virtues to which you have to conform. From this perspective, everything in life should be viewed as either pleasure or pain, and "absence of pain" means nothing more than "pleasure." Yes, the complete absence of all pain is by definition the highest pleasure, and when you're debating with other philosophers who tell you that pleasure can't be the best there is because there is no limit to the search for pleasure, that can be your answer to them. Principal Doctrine 3: The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

And you do need to remember that, because depending on the people you spend your time with, there will be Ciceros and Senecas and Stoics and Platonists and Aristotelians and others who will constantly try to talk you down from having confidence in your position.

But what most of you really want to know is something else: How should you spend your time? What pleasures should you pursue? What pains should you avoid? And there it's up to you to weigh the options that are available to you. No one has authority from god or anywhere else to make those decisions for you. Consider all the options as intelligently as you can, and think about such things as intensity, duration, and parts of your mind or body that will be involved. Then, make the choice that you think you'll be happiest with when you get to the end of your life and look back at how you spent it. After you die there will be no gods or magic Epicureans to tell you "well done," but if you remember that Pleasure means everything in life - mental, emotional, physical - everything in life that you find to be desirable - then you will have taken to heart Epicurus's advice when he said "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."

Thank you for your time.

3. Frequently Asked Questions

3.1. GENERAL

3.1.1. What Would Epicurus Say About The Search For "Meaning" in Life?

The starting point for answering this question is much the same as asking about any other decision about what to pursue. The place to start is to identify the ultimate goal or thing to pursue in life, and decide whether "meaning" or "meaningfulness" is some part or all of that goal. Epicurus holds that the highest good in life is Pleasure, which is the first and natural good.

Letter to Menoeceus [129]: And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.

Authoritative texts hammer home the point that the highest good in life is "Pleasure."

Cicero: On Ends Book One - [29] IX. “‘First, then,’ said he, ‘I shall plead my case on the lines laid down by the founder of our school himself: I shall define the essence and features of the problem before us, not because I imagine you to be unacquainted with them, but with a view to the methodical progress of my speech. The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil….”

Cicero: On Ends Book One “Nor indeed can our mind find any other ground whereon to take its stand as though already at the goal; and all its fears and sorrows are comprised under the term pain, nor is there any other thing besides which is able merely by its own character to cause us vexation or pangs In addition to this the germs of desire and aversion and generally of action originate either in pleasure or in pain.” [42] This being so, it is plain that all right and praiseworthy action has the life of pleasure for its aim. Now inasmuch as the climax or goal or limit of things good (which the Greeks term telos) is that object which is not a means to the attainment of any thing else, while all other things are a means to its attainment, we must allow that the climax of things good is to live pleasurably.“

Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32: “I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.”

Given that Pleasure is the goal, we must therefore ask if "meaning" or "meaningfulness" is a feeling of pleasure in itself, or instrumental to obtaining pleasure.

In answering that question we should ask: "How many possible types of feelings are there within which "meaning" might be included?"

Epicurus holds that there are only two "feelings" in life - pleasure and pain - and at all times that we are conscious of feeling anything, we are feeling one or the other.

Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“

Epicurus PD03 : ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“

Cicero - On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

Cicero - On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“

The first appearance of the phrase 'meaning of life' in the written record of the English language dates only from 1831:

SARTOR RESARTUS: The Life and Opinions of Herr Teufelsdrockh, by Thomas Carlyle, ~1831 CHAPTER IX. THE EVERLASTING YEA.

"Temptations in the Wilderness!" exclaims Teufelsdrockh, "Have we not all to be tried with such? Not so easily can the old Adam, lodged in us by birth, be dispossessed. Our Life is compassed round with Necessity; yet is the meaning of Life itself no other than Freedom, than Voluntary Force: thus have we a warfare; in the beginning, especially, a hard-fought battle. For the God-given mandate, Work thou in Well-doing, lies mysteriously written, in Promethean Prophetic Characters, in our hearts; and leaves us no rest, night or day, till it be deciphered and obeyed; till it burn forth, in our conduct, a visible, acted Gospel of Freedom. And as the clay-given mandate, Eat thou and be filled, at the same time persuasively proclaims itself through every nerve,—must not there be a confusion, a contest, before the better Influence can become the upper?

"To me nothing seems more natural than that the Son of Man, when such God-given mandate first prophetically stirs within him, and the Clay must now be vanquished or vanquish,—should be carried of the spirit into grim Solitudes, and there fronting the Tempter do grimmest battle with him; defiantly setting him at naught till he yield and fly. Name it as we choose: with or without visible Devil, whether in the natural Desert of rocks and sands, or in the populous moral Desert of selfishness and baseness,—to such Temptation are we all called. Unhappy if we are not! Unhappy if we are but Half-men, in whom that divine handwriting has never blazed forth, all-subduing, in true sun-splendor; but quivers dubiously amid meaner lights: or smoulders, in dull pain, in darkness, under earthly vapors!—Our Wilderness is the wide World in an Atheistic Century; our Forty Days are long years of suffering and fasting: nevertheless, to these also comes an end. Yes, to me also was given, if not Victory, yet the consciousness of Battle, and the resolve to persevere therein while life or faculty is left. To me also, entangled in the enchanted forests, demon-peopled, doleful of sight and of sound, it was given, after weariest wanderings, to work out my way into the higher sunlit slopes—of that Mountain which has no summit, or whose summit is in Heaven only!" … On the roaring billows of Time, thou art not engulfed, but borne aloft into the azure of Eternity. Love not Pleasure; love God. This is the EVERLASTING YEA, wherein all contradiction is solved: wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him."

Note that this text is considered a parody of Hegel, and that modern scholars find Carlyle's own opinions difficult to isolate. Here is a quote from Carlyle himself in a letter:

Finally assure yourself I am neither Pagan nor Turk, nor circumcised Jew, but an unfortunate Christian individual resident at Chelsea in this year of Grace; neither Pantheist nor Pottheist1, nor any Theist or ist whatsoever; having the most decided contem[pt] for all manner of System-builders and Sectfounders—as far as contempt may be com[patible] with so mild a nature; feeling well beforehand (taught by long experience) that all such are and even must be wrong. By God's blessing, one has got two eyes to look with; also a mind capable of knowing, of believing: that is all the creed I will at this time insist on.

1'Pot-theist'; Carlyle was accused of pan-theism. Pot, pan, you get the idea

Accordingly, we don't have record of Epicurus directly using the term "meaning" in regard to pleasure, but we do know from the surviving texts that Epicurus categorized every feeling in life which is not painful as pleasurable. Is "meaning" something that is pleasurable or painful? Most of us would likely agree that "meaningfulness" or "meaning" is something that generates a positive emotion and that is the reason that many people suggest we should seek it. Given that all positive emotions are categorized by Epicurus as a part of pleasure, Epicurus would then say "Yes," - meaning or meaningfulness is a desirable goal because it is pleasurable.

What about the claim some make that "meaning" should be thought of as "virtue," and that "virtue is something higher and nobler than "pleasure." Calls to "meaningfulness" often seem to come from a similar perspective as "virtue," and so the Epicurean analysis of virtue is helpful in assessing "meaningfulness." In addition to the cite above from Diogenes of Oinoanda that pursuing virtue as an end in itself confuses the means with the end, we have Cicero's Torquatus explaining the same point in Cicero's On Ends Book One, of which the following is only a small part of a much more extensive argument:

Cicero - On Ends Book One XIII: Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure.

For those who remain confused and think that "Pleasure" is restricted to bodily stimulation and does not involve the feelings of the mind, we have additional sources that make clear that Epicurus valued mental pleasure, and observed that mental pleasure (and pain) is frequently of much greater significance to us than bodily feeling:

Cicero On Ends Book One [40] XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance.

Cicero On Ends Book One [55] XVII. I will concisely explain what are the corollaries of these sure and well grounded opinions. People make no mistake about the standards of good and evil themselves, that is about pleasure or pain, but err in these matters through ignorance of the means by which these results are to be brought about. Now we admit that mental pleasures and pains spring from bodily pleasures and pains; so I allow what you alleged just now, that any of our school who differ from this opinion are out of court; and indeed I see there are many such, but unskilled thinkers. I grant that although mental pleasure brings us joy and mental pain brings us trouble, yet each feeling takes its rise in the body and is dependent on the body, though it does not follow that the pleasures and pains of the mind do not greatly surpass those of the body. With the body indeed we can perceive only what is present to us at the moment, but with the mind the past and future also. _For granting that we feel just as great pain when our body is in pain, still mental pain may be very greatly intensified if we imagine some everlasting and unbounded evil to be menacing us. And we may apply the same argument to pleasure, so that it is increased by the absence of such fears. By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body.

*Based on the above, it is likely that Epicurus would recognize that "meaning" in life is simply a type of Pleasure. Epicurus tells us to look to Nature, not to logic or abstract reasoning, to determine what specific pleasures are most appropriate for us to pursue as individuals. Pleasures vary by duration, intensity, and parts of the body affected (see Principal Doctrine 9: "If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.") Some will decide that mental pleasures of "meaning," will be the type of pleasure on which they choose to focus. The proper standard is to look to our own feelings by which to decide what to pursue, and no single factor, even time or length of duration of the pleasure, is determinative. As Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus, "And just as with food [the wise man] does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

3.1.2. What is this debate I see in Epicurean commentary about Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasure? Ethics

3.1.3. How do you defend Epicurus' view of free will? Physics

3.1.4. What is Epicurean Philosophy All About? General

3.1.5. Which Is It? Is "Ataraxia" Or "Pleasure" Or "Tranquility" The Ultimate Epicurean Goal? Ethics

3.1.6. Are Stoics, Buddhists, Judeo-Christians, Humanists, Minimalists, et al. Welcome At EpicureanFriends? General

3.1.7. What Did Epicurus Mean When He Spoke of "Pleasure?"

3.1.8. What Are The Most Important Principles Of The Epicurean System?

3.1.9. What Does Epicurean Philosophy Say About "Free Will"?

3.1.10. Can You Suggest A Reading List For Learning About Epicurus?

3.1.11. What Does Epicurean Philosophy Say About Engagement With Society?

3.1.12. How Does Epicurean Philosophy Differ From Stoicism?

3.1.13. How Does Epicurean Philosophy Differ From Buddhism?

3.1.14. How Can I Implement Epicurean Principles As Quickly As Possible?

3.1.15. What Is The Epicurean Definition Of A God?

3.1.16. What Is The Epicurean Definition Of "Anticipations" ("Prolepsis")?

3.1.17. What is the Epicurean Definition of Happiness?

3.1.18. What Was Epicurus' Position On Skepticism and Dogmatism?

3.1.19. What did Epicurus say about Desire? Is All Desire Bad and To Be Minimized?

3.1.20. What Is The Epicurean Definition of "Virtue"?

3.1.21. What Did Epicurus Say About the Relationship Between Good and Evil?

3.1.22. What Is The Relationship Between Epicurean Philosophy And Religion?

3.1.23. What Would Epicurus Say To Someone Who Complains "The World Is Unjust / Life Isn't Fair"?

3.1.24. What Is This I Read All Over The Internet About "Katastematic" and "Kinetic" Pleasure?

3.2. HISTORY

3.2.1. When Was Epicurus Born?

3.2.2. What Was The Basic TimeLine of Events in the History of the Epicurean School?

3.2.3. Who Were The Leading Figures In Epicurean History?

3.3. EPISTEMOLOGY - CANONICS

3.3.1. What Is The Epicurean Science of Knowledge (the Canon of Truth)?

3.3.2. What Did Epicurus Say About The Relation Between "Reason" and "The Senses?"

3.3.3. What Distinguishes Epicurus from other philosophers on the nature of Truth?

3.4. PHYSICS - The Science of The Nature of Man and the Universe

3.4.1. What Did Epicurus Say About the Nature of the Universe (Physics)?

3.4.2. To What Extent, If Any, Does Modern Physics Invalidate Epicurean Philosophy? * How do you square modern science with Epicurean physics as to the universe having a beginning?

3.4.3. Was Epicurus an "Atheist?"

3.4.4. What did Epicurus say about whether the universe had a beginning?

3.4.5. What Did Epicurus Say About Whether Humans Have A "Soul"?

3.4.6. What did Epicurus Say about the size of the sun and whether the Earth was round or flat?

3.4.7. Does living happily requires a knowledge of physics, and the nature of the universe?

3.4.8. Does "Big Bang" Theory Invalidate Epicuran "Eternal Universe" Theory?

3.5. Ethics - The Science of How To Live

3.5.1. What Are the Central Points of Epicurean Philosophy About How To Live (Ethics)?

3.5.2. *What is the issue with saying that the Epicurean goal of life is Tranqulity?

3.5.3. What Did Epicurus Say About "The Good" and "The Greatest Good"?

3.5.4. What Did Epicurus Say About "The Guide" and "The Goal" of Human Life?

3.5.5. Does Epicurus contradict himself by seeming to say that both absence of pain and pleasure are the goal of life?

3.5.6. What Did Epicurus Say About Marriage?

3.5.7. What did Epicurus say about the value of friendship?

3.5.8. What Advice Did Epicurus Give About One's General Attitude Toward The Future?

3.5.9. Would An Epicurean Hook Himself Up To An "Experience Machine" or A "Pleasure Machine" if Possible?

3.6. Miscellaneous

3.6.1. Where Can I Find The Best List of Fragments of Epicurean Texts?

3.6.2. How Can I Participate Here At EpicureanFriends?

3.6.3. What Is The Society Of Friends of Epicurus and What is its Relationship to EpicureanFriends.com?

4. The Major Tenets of Classical Epicurean Philosophy

Classical Epicurean Philosophy rejects many assumptions that are commonplace to other philosophies, such as "pleasure," "gods," "virtue," and even "good and evil." In Epicurean philosophy, pleasure embraces much more than sensory stimulation, gods exist but are not supernatural, and while it is important to act virtuously, virtue is not desirable as an end it itself, but as a means of obtaining pleasure. Likewise, "Good" and "evil" are not abstract absolutes, but are ultimately evaluations based on sensations of pleasure and pain felt by real living things. Practical Reason is held to be essential for living wisely, but dialectical logic is rejected as misleading.

In order to clarify the distinctive aspects of Classical Epicurean Philosophy for both new readers and regular members alike, we place special emphasis on a number of the most central aspects of Epicurean doctrine. These points include:

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4895-mainstatements071624-jpg

Epicurean philosophy is generally divided into Physics, Canonics, and Ethics, and we organize this Handbook along similar lines.

4.1. Physics

Epicurus erected his entire philosophy upon his understanding that the universe is composed of and governed by elemental particles moving through space. Our Physics forum is the place to discuss the nature of the universe, including all things within it, includes the natural "gods" which are part of it. Among the details that Epicurus taught were:

"Atoms" (Indivisible Particles) Moving Through Void Are The Natural Building Blocks Of The Universe. The Properties Of Atoms are shape, size, and weight. Atoms move in cetain ways, but they also have the capacity to swerve at no fixed time or place, and this leads to the Rejection of Determinism. Void Is the space within which atoms exist and move.
Void
Infinity
Eternality
"Bodies" are combinations of atoms and void. Bodies have properties and qualities, and give rise to emergence and events
Through observation we see evidence and can conclude that nothing can be created from nothing. Together with the observation that nothing is ever destroyed completely to nothing, these deducions lead us to conclude that the Universe Is Eternal In Time, that the The Universe Is Boundless (Infinite In Size). We also conclude that the Universe Contains Life On Other Worlds.

4.1.1. Nothing Can Be Created From Nothing.

Based on this observation, and the observation that nothing is every destroyed completely to nothing, Epicurus deduced that the universe as a whole is eternal in time, and was not created by supernatural gods or forces. The universe as a whole has always existed and will always exist.

Epicurus wrote in his letter to Herodotus, at line 38 (Bailey): "[N]othing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds."

Lucretius wrote at 1:146 (Bailey): "This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature; whose first rule shall take its start for us from this, that nothing is ever begotten of nothing by divine will." Note: A more precise translation than Bailey renders would likely be: "Nothing can be created from that which did not previously exist." In general the point is that everything comes from that which already exists, meaning that nothing comes from that which does not already exist.””

4.1.2. The Universe Is Infinite In Size And Eternal In Time And Has No Gods Over It.

Epicurus also deduced that the universe is infinite in size, and that through infinity all things that are possible to come into existence, such as the Earth, will come into existence an infinite number of times, and that life exists in an infinite number of places throughout the universe. Supernatural gods, however, and things that are not possible, do not exist at all.

As to the universe being infinite in size:

Lucretius wrote at 1:951 - “But since I have taught that the most solid bodies of matter fly about for ever unvanquished through the ages, come now, let us unfold, whether there be a certain limit to their full sum or not; and likewise the void that we have discovered, or room or space, in which all things are carried on, let us see clearly whether it is all altogether bounded or spreads out limitless and immeasurably deep.
[958] The whole universe then is bounded in no direction of its ways; for then it would be bound to have an extreme point. Now it is seen that nothing can have an extreme point, unless there be something beyond to bound it, so that there is seen to be a spot further than which the nature of our sense cannot follow it. As it is, since we must admit that there is nothing outside the whole sum, it has not an extreme point, it lacks therefore bound and limit. Nor does it matter in which quarter of it you take your stand; so true is it that, whatever place every man takes up, he leaves the whole boundless just as much on every side.
[968] Moreover, suppose now that all space were created finite, if one were to run on to the end, to its furthest coasts, and throw a flying dart, would you have it that that dart, hurled with might and main, goes on whither it is sped and flies afar, or do you think that something can check and bar its way? For one or the other you must needs admit and choose. Yet both shut off your escape and constrain you to grant that the universe spreads out free from limit. For whether there is something to check it and bring it about that it arrives not whither it was sped, nor plants itself in the goal, or whether it fares forward, it set not forth from the end. In this way I will press on, and wherever you shall set the furthest coasts, I shall ask what then becomes of the dart. It will come to pass that nowhere can a bound be set and room for flight ever prolongs the chance of flight. Lastly, before our eyes one thing is seen to bound another; air is as a wall between the hills, and mountains between tracts of air, land bounds the sea, and again sea bounds all lands; yet the universe in truth there is nothing to limit outside.
[984] Moreover, if all the space in the whole universe were shut in on all sides, and were created with borders determined, and had been bounded, then the store of matter would have flowed together with solid weight from all sides to the bottom, nor could anything be carried on beneath the canopy of the sky, nor would there be sky at all, nor the light of the sun, since in truth all matter would lie idle piled together by sinking down from limitless time. But as it is, no rest, we may be sure, has been granted to the bodies of the first-beginnings, because there is no bottom at all, whither they may, as it were, flow together, and make their resting-place. All things are for ever carried on in ceaseless movement from all sides, and bodies of matter, are even stirred up and supplied from beneath out of limitless space.
[998] Lastly, one thing is seen before our eyes to be the limit of another; air separates hills and mountains air, earth bounds sea and contrariwise the sea is the boundary of all lands; the universe, however, has nothing outside to be its limit.

As to the universe as a whole having always existed, and that it will always exist:

Epicurus wrote to Herodotus at 37 - Having made these points clear, we must now consider things imperceptible to the senses. First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds. And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.
Velleius stated in Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods at 1:IX - But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was.

As to infinity allowing things that are possible - such as the Earth - to occur an unlimited number of times:

Velleius stated in Cicero's On The Nature of The Gods, 1:XIX - Moreover, there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study….
Epicurus wrote to Herodotus at 45 - These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things. Furthermore, there are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours. For the atoms being infinite in number, as was proved already, are borne on far out into space. For those atoms, which are of such nature that a world could be created out of them or made by them, have not been used up either on one world or on a limited number of worlds, nor again on all the worlds which are alike, or on those which are different from these. So that there nowhere exists an obstacle to the infinite number of the worlds.
Lucretius wrote at 2:522 - And since I have taught this much, I will hasten to link on a truth which holds to it and wins belief from it, that the first-beginnings of things, which are formed with a shape like to one another, are in number infinite. For since the difference of forms is limited, it must needs be that those which are alike are unlimited, or else that the sum of matter is created limited, which I have proved not to be, showing in my verses that the tiny bodies of matter from everlasting always keep up the sum of things, as the team of blows is harnessed on unbroken on every side. [532] For in that you see that certain animals are more rare, and perceive that nature is less fruitful in them, yet in another quarter and spot, in some distant lands, there may be many in that kind, and so the tale is made up; even as in the race of four-footed beasts we see that elephants with their snaky hands come first of all, by whose many thousands India is embattled with a bulwark of ivory, so that no way can be found into its inner parts: so great is the multitude of those beasts, whereof we see but a very few samples. [541] But still, let me grant this too, let there be, if you will, some one thing unique, alone in the body of its birth, to which there is not a fellow in the whole wide world; yet unless there is an unlimited stock of matter, from which it might be conceived and brought to birth, it will not be able to be created, nor, after that, to grow on and be nourished.
Lucretius wrote at 3:843 - And even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling, after it has been rent asunder from our body, yet it is naught to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain. And even now we care not at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now; and yet we cannot recall that in our mind's memory; for in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere far astray from sense.
Diogenes of Oinoanda wrote in his Letter to Antipater - Fr. 63 - So, as I was saying, having had my appetite most keenly whetted by all the advantage of the voyage, I shall try to meet you as soon as winter had ended, sailing first either to Athens or to Chalcis and Boeotia. But, since this is uncertain, both on account of the changeability and inconstancy of our fortunes and on account of my old age besides, I am sending you, in accordance with your request, the arguments concerning an infinite number of worlds. And you have enjoyed good fortune in the matter; for, before your letter arrived, Theodoridas of Lindus, a member of our school not unknown to you, who is still a novice in philosophy, was dealing with the same doctrine. And this doctrine came to be better articulated as a result of being turned over between the two of us face to face; for our agreements and disagreements with one another, and also our questionings, rendered the inquiry into the object of our search more precise. I am therefore sending you that dialogue, Antipater, so that you may be in the same position as if you yourself were present, like Theodoridas, agreeing about some matters and making further inquires in cases where you had doubts. The dialogue began something like this: «Diogenes,» said Theodoridas, «that the [doctrine laid down] by Epicurus on an infinite number of worlds is true [I am confident]….

As to life existing in an infinite number of places throughout the universe:

Lucretius wrote at 2:1048 - First of all, we find that in every direction everywhere, and on either side, above and below, through all the universe, there is no limit, as I have shown, and indeed the truth cries out for itself and the nature of the deep shines clear. Now in no way must we think it likely, since towards every side is infinite empty space, and seeds in unnumbered numbers in the deep universe fly about in many ways driven on in everlasting motion, that this one world and sky was brought to birth, but that beyond it all those bodies of matter do naught; above all, since this world was so made by nature, as the seeds of things themselves of their own accord, jostling from time to time, were driven together in many ways, rashly, idly, and in vain, and at last those united, which, suddenly cast together, might become ever and anon the beginnings of great things, of earth and sea and sky, and the race of living things. Wherefore, again and again, you must needs confess that there are here and there other gatherings of matter, such as is this, which the ether holds in its greedy grip.
[2:1067] Moreover, when there is much matter ready to hand, when space is there, and no thing, no cause delays, things must, we may be sure, be carried on and completed. As it is, if there is so great a store of seeds as the whole life of living things could not number, and if the same force and nature abides which could throw together the seeds of things, each into their place in like manner as they are thrown together here, it must needs be that you confess that there are other worlds in other regions, and diverse races of men and tribes of wild beasts.
[2:1077] This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this wise is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this wise the stock of men, in this wise again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.

As to supernatural gods not creating the universe, not ruling over the universe, and not existing at all, but that any "gods" that exist are within the universe and entirely natural:

Epicurus wrote to Herodotus at 77 - Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors).
Epicurus wrote to Pythocles at 97 - Next the regularity of the periods of the heavenly bodies must be understood in the same way as such regularity is seen in some of the events that happen on earth. And do not let the divine nature be introduced at any point into these considerations, but let it be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness.
Lucretius wrote at 2:1090 - "And if you learn this surely, and cling to it, nature is seen, free at once, and quit of her proud rulers, doing all things of her own accord alone, without control of gods." Humphries - Holding this knowledge, you can't help but see, That nature has no tyrants over her, But always acts of her own will; she has no part of any godhead whatsoever.*” Brown 1743 - "These things, if you rightly apprehend, Nature will appear free in her operations, *wholly from under the power of domineering deities, and to act all things voluntarily, and of herself, without the assistance of gods." Munro - "If you well apprehend and keep in mind these things, nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods." M.F. Smith - "Once you obtain a firm grasp of these facts, you see that nature is her own mistress and is exempt from the oppression of arrogant despots, accomplishing everything by herself spontaneously and independently and free from the jurisdiction of the gods."

4.1.3. The Nature of Gods Contains Nothing That Is Inconsistent With Incorruption And Blessedness

Epicurus held that it is necessary to have a proper view of the nature of divinity in order to live happily. Although there are no supernatural gods, Epicurus concluded that gods of a sort do exist. These gods are not supernatural, and are not omnipotent or omniscient, but instead we are led by Nature to conceive of such beings. When we study the universe and compare our conceptions to what we observe here on earth about the best modes of life, we conclude that we expect the universe to contain beings which have achieved perfect happiness and deathlessness. We do not observe these beings on earth, but we can reasonably speculate that they do exist, and we can benefit from thinking about the nature of godlike beings, which causes us to realize that we have nothing to fear from them, and that such thoughts are beneficial to our own happiness. A second major conclusion is that the universe contains Nothing supernatural. This means that Nature has no gods over her, and it also means that there are no supernatural forms or essences or other natures – all that exists is composed of atoms and void. Corollory conclusions are that there is nothing above or outside the universe.

Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus at [123] - The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men's minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his incorruption or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and incorruption. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many. [124] For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien.
Lucretius wrote at [6:43] - (Brown) "The various wonders men behold in the earth and in the heavens perplex their minds, trembling and in suspense, and make them humble with the fear of the gods, and press them groveling to the ground; and being ignorant of the cause of these events, they are forced to confess the sovereignty and give up everything to the command of these deities. And the effects they are unable to account for by reason they imagine were brought about by the influence of the gods; for such as well know that the gods lead a life of tranquility and ease, if they should still wonder by what power the world is carried on, especially in the the things they see over their heads in the heavens above, they relapse again into their old superstition; they raise over themselves a set of cruel tyrants who, the wretches fancy, can do all things, because they know nothing of what can or what cannot be, or by what means a finite power is fixed to every being, and a boundary immovable which it cannot pass. Such are more liable to mistakes and to be carried widely from the right way. [68] Unless you purge your mind of such conceits, and banish them from your breast, and forebear to think unworthily of the gods, by charging them with things that break their peace, those sacred deities you will believe are always angry and offended with you; not that the supreme power of the gods can be so ruffled as to be eager to punish severely in their resentments, but because you fancy those beings, who enjoy a perfect peace in themselves, are subject to anger and the extravagances of revenge: and therefore you will no more approach their shrines with an easy mind, no more in tranquility and peace will you be able to receive the images, the representations of their divine forms, that form from their pure bodies and strike powerfully upon the minds of men: From hence you may collect what a wretched life you are to lead."
Lucretius wrote at [3:14-30] (Johnston): "For once that philosophy which arose in your godlike mind has begun to speak about the nature of things, then terrors in the mind disperse, the world's walls fall open, I see what is going on in all the void, the majesty and calm habitations of the gods reveal themselves in places where no winds disturb, no clouds bring showers, no white snow falls congealed with bitter frost to harm them, the always cloudless aether vaults above, and they smile, as far and as wide as the light spreads out. Then, too, nature provides plentiful supplies of all things – their peace is not disturbed by anything at any time. The regions of Acheron, by contrast, are nowhere to be see, and earth presents no barrier to a full view of all events going on throughout the void lying underfoot. Godlike pleasure and awe take hold of me up there with these things, to think that nature, through your genius, is laid out so clearly, so openly exposed on every side."

4.1.4. Death Is Nothing To Us.

Epicurus held that consciousness is an attribute of the body, and ends forever at death. As a result, there is no life of any kind after death, and thus there is no punishment or reward after death for our actions in life. While it is true that after we die we no longer exist to have any concerns, we of course are still concerned as to the manner of our death (in terms of whether the steps leading up to it are painful), and the timing of our death (in terms of how long we live). The reverse of this doctrine is also true: Given that for an eternity before birth and for an eternity after death we have no life at all, our life while we have it is extremely important to us. There is no existence after death. There is one life to live, and, afterwards, we no longer exist except in the memories of friends and loved ones. Epicurean physics teaches us that all bodies which come together as a result of atoms moving through void eventually break apart, as a result of which we conclude that the human sould is born and dies with the human body. While the fact of death is of great concern to our plans and conduct of life, the state of "being dead" is nothing(ness) to us, as our souls or consciousness do not survive, and we end all awareness at death.

Epicurus wrote in Principal Doctrine 2 - "Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us."
Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus at [125] - "For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. So that the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. For that which gives no trouble when it comes is but an empty pain in anticipation. So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more."
Lucretius wrote at [3:912] - This too men often do, when they are lying at the board, and hold their cups in their hands, and shade their faces with garlands: they say from the heart, 'Brief is this enjoyment for us puny men: soon it will be past, nor ever thereafter will it be ours to call it back.' As though in death this were to be foremost among their ills, that thirst would burn the poor wretches and parch them with its drought, or that there would abide with them a yearning for any other thing. For never does any man long for himself and life, when mind and body alike rest in slumber. For all we care sleep may then be never-ending, nor does any yearning for ourselves then beset us. And yet at that time those first-beginnings stray not at all far through our frame away from the motions that bring sense, when a man springs up from sleep and gathers himself together. Much less then should we think that death is to us, if there can be less than what we see to be nothing; for at our dying there follows a greater turmoil and scattering abroad of matter, nor does any one wake and rise again, whom the chill breach of life has once overtaken.
Lucretius wrote at [3:560] - (Munro) "Therefore, again and again I say, when the enveloping body has been all broken up and the vital airs have been forced out, you must admit that the senses of the mind and the soul are dissolved, since the cause of destruction is one and inseparable for both body and soul."
Lucretius wrote at [3:679] - (Munro) "Wherefore, again and again I say, we must believe souls to be neither without a birth nor exempted from the law of death; for we must not believe that they could have been so completely united with our bodies, if they found their way into them from without, nor since they are so closely interwoven with them, does it appear that they can get out unharmed and unloose themselves unscathed from all the sinews and bones and joints."

4.1.5. There Is No Necessity To Live Under The Control Of Necessity.

Epicurus held that what we call today "Hard determinism" is observably wrong. He held this for, among other reasons, that (at the very least) we can control when we exit life. This is not an invitation to conclude that suicide is a proper course because necessity rules our existence, but to the contrary an affirmation that the fact that we have the power to end our lives is an example of how necessity does not rule every aspect of our existence, implying also that not only life and death but many decisions of lesser importance are also under our control. Epicurus is reputed throughout history for his strong Rejection of Determinism. Epicurus wrote in his letter to Menoeceus that it would be better to live under false ideas of the gods than it would be to live believing that we have no control at all over our actions or our future.

Epicurus wrote in Vatican Saying 9 - "Necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity."
Epicurus wrote in Vatican Saying 40 - "The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity."
Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus at [133] - "For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain; he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. (He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame. [134] For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god's acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause (of all things) for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it. [135] He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. For it is better in a man's actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance."

4.2. Canonics

Canonics, often known as "epistemology," is closely related to physics. At the same time that we observe and derive our conclusions about the nature of the universe, we must examine what it means to "know" anything. What is truth? What is real? Is confidence in knowledge (or "certainty") possible? These are issues discussed in our Canonics forums, where we do not focus as much on "what" is true, but "how do we know what is true?" The principles of Canonics are discussed in more detail in our ]][[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/154-general-principles-of-epicurean-canonics/][General Principles of Epicurean Canonics section, and are reconstructed from the ]][[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/147-key-citations-in-canonics/][Key Citations In Canonics that remain from the ancient world.

4.2.1. He Who Says "Nothing Can Be Known" Knows Nothing

Epicurus was a strong opponent of skepticism in philosophy, and he opposed both radical skeptics like Pyrrho and those like Plato who focused on arguing that the senses are not reliable sources of knowledge. Epicurus held that Knowledge is possible, and that through knowledge we can learn how to attain happiness.

Major Implications
1. Radical skepticism is self-contradictory nonsense.
Citations:
1. Lucretius 4:469
  1. [469] Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?
2. Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 5
  1. Smith: "Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black."
Notes:
Discussion Forum

4.2.2. All Sensations Are True

Epicurus held that truth is grounded in the sensations, and that we must accept that all sensations are true - not "true" in the literal sense that every glimpse of light gives us complete knowledge of the world, but true in the sense of honestly reported without injection of opinion. Epicurus held that errors occur in the mind, in putting together and reaching conclusions about what the sensations are telling us, not in the sensations themselves, which report basic data but do not tell us what that data means.

Epicurus held that the Natural Faculties are (1) The Anticipations Or "Prolepsis", (2) The Five Senses, and (3) The Faculty Of Pleasure And Pain. Epicurus held that Illusions Do Not Invalidate The Senses, and that we must consider not only what the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and sense of touch tell us, but also what our minds receive directly in the form of Images from the outside world.

Epicurus taught that we should defer to the Priority Of Nature Over "Logic," and that we should reject "Dialectic" as a source of knowledge. He taught the importance of Practical Deductive Reasoning, of Clarity, and of "Waiting" before making a decision where multiple possibilities that are consistent with observation support different conclusions. Epicurus held that in some cases we cannot obtain certainty and the elmination of all but one possibilities, so we must at times allow that Multiple Possibilities may be true. The selection of one possibility among many, when many are equally supported by the evidence, is therefore seen as arbitrary and capricious.

Major Implications: Error does not occur in the senses, but in the mind in forming opinions about what the sensations are reporting.
Citations:
1. Epicurus to Herodotus 38 - [We] must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen. … Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said.
2. Lucretius 1:418 - For that body exists is declared by the feeling which all share alike; and unless faith in this feeling be firmly grounded at once and prevail, there will be naught to which we can make appeal about things hidden, so as to prove aught by the reasoning of the mind.
3. Lucretius 4:478 - You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true. Next then, what must be held to be of greater surety than sense? Will reason, sprung from false sensation, avail to speak against the senses, when it is wholly sprung from the senses? For unless they are true, all reason too becomes false.
4. Torquatus speaking for Epicurus in On Ends 1:64 - Moreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. Now those who invalidate sensations and say that perception is altogether impossible, cannot even clear the way for this very argument of theirs when they have thrust the senses aside. Moreover, when cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated.
  Epicurus to Herodotus 51 - (Yonge) "And, on the other side, error could not be possible, if we did not receive some other motion also, a sort of initiative of intelligence connected, it is true, with direct representation, but going beyond that representative. These conceptions being connected with direct perception which produces the representation, but going beyond it."
5. Epicurus On Nature Book 28, Sedley trans, fr. 13, col. 6 inf. - “I also frequently reflected that if, when I raised difficulties which someone might have turned against us, he should claim that what used to be assimilated from ordinary language was the same as used to be practiced in the written work, many might well conclude that in those days false opinion was represented in that language, whether through an empirical process, an image-based process, or a theoretical process, or through a non-empirical process, not following one of our current divisions, but simply arising from an internal movement; but that now, because the means of expression is adapted to additional ends, discrimination provides a lead towards the truth. However, let no one ever try to get even with you by linking with you any trace of this suspicion; but [turn] to the entire faculty of empirical reasoning…
6. (Aetius 4.8.10) "Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus say that sensation and thought arise in the soul from images that approach from outside, for neither of these can occur to anyone without the image falling upon him."
7. (Aetius 4.9.5 - 6) "Epicurus says that every sensation and every impression is true, but of the opinions some are true and some false; and sensation gives us a false picture in one respect only, namely with regard to objects of thought; but the impression does so in two respects, for there is impression of both sense objects and objects of thought. Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and Heraclides say that the particular sensations of their own object occur in accordance with the matching sized of the pores, each of the sense objects corresponding to each sense."
8. Notes:
9. Discussion Forum

4.3. Ethics

Ethics is the application of Physics and Canonics to determine the best way to live. Consult Our ]][[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/155-epicurean-ethics/][Epicurean Ethics page for much more detail, or read discussions about the subject in our Ethics forums. Some of the most important principles of Epicurean Ethics are:

4.3.1. Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End In Itself. All Good And Evil Consists in Sensation.

In contrast to almost every other school of philosophy, Epicurus held that virtue Is not absolute or an end in itself. Epicurus held that virtue Is not the same for all people, times, and places, and instead virtue should be considered to be action which is instrumental to achieving a life of Pleasure.

The Epicurean texts contain much discussion of how to view such virtues as: Piety (the proper attitude toward divinity), Prudence, Friendship, Courage, Justice, Honesty, Confidence, Benevolence, Temperance, Considerateness, Hope, Independence / Self Sufficiency, Memory And Presence of Mind, Proper Political And Social Relations, Gratitude, Health of Mind, Health of Body.

Pleasure Is The Guide of Life (The Highest Good)

Epicurus' conclusions as to Pleasure being the highest good, and the guide of life, are among his most controversial. This topic is discussed at length, with citations, here.

Major Implications:
1. Absolute ideas of good and evil, as well as virtue, are not valid because such things do not have an independent existence in reality.
2. Good and evil are relevant only to living beings.
3. Justice is relative to the individuals involved and is not the same for all people at all times, and at all places.
4. What it just at some times for some persons will change with circumstances.
5. Justice is but one example of a "virtue," and just as there is no absolute justice there is no absolute virtue.
Citations:
1. Letter to Menoeceus [124]
  1. Bailey: "Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality."
  2. Hicks: "Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality."
  3. Inwood-Gerson: "Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for immortality."
  4. Epicurus Wiki (Epicurism.info): ” Accustom yourself to thinking that death is no concern to us. All things good and bad are experienced through sensation, but sensation ceases at death. So death is nothing to us, and to know the truth of this makes a mortal life happy – not by adding infinite time, but by removing the desire for immortality.”
  5. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 33
    1. Bailey: “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.
  6. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 36
    1. Bailey: "In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all."
  7. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 37
    1. Bailey: "Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts."
  8. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 38:
    1. Bailey: "Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage."

4.3.2. Pleasure is The Guide of Life.

Major Implications:
1. Neither supernatural gods nor ideal forms nor logic or rationalism are the guides of life.
Citations:
1. As to the definition of Pleasure, see the following citations and the related answer in the FAQ List:
  1. Pleasure is one of the feelings, of which there are only two - pleasure and pain:
    1. Diogenes Laertius 10:34 : ”/The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“/
    2. On Ends 1:30 : ”/Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?/
  2. Given that there are only two feelings, you are feeling one or the other at all times if you are feeling anything at all:
    1. On Ends 1:38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
  3. As to pleasure and pain being separate and unmixed in any particular feeling:
    1. PD03 : ”/The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once/ .“
  4. All of those taken together show that Epicurus did not limit pleasure to what we generally think of as sensory stimulation, but included within pleasure all states of awareness of life that are not felt to be painful. You can see an explicit example of that here in regard to discussion of one's hand in its normal state of affairs, whenever it is not in some affirmative pain:
    1. On Ends 1:39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
  5. This position is asserted by comparing the conditions of two people who are not in pain, but who are seemingly in very different conditions: A host at a party who is pouring wine to a guest who is drinking it. Here is the example:
    1. On Ends 2:16 : "This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?" [Torquatus objects to the question as quibbling but the implicit answer is "yes" based on the condition of "not being thirsty" and "the thirsty man who drinks" both being conditions of pleasure.”]
  6. This means that Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present to be pleasure. It's significant to remember "conditions of awareness" because he is not saying that a rock, which is not feeling pain, to be feeling pleasure. Only the living can feel pleasure or pain, but when you and aware of your condition all of your feelings can be categorized as either painful or pleasurable. You can see this sweeping categorization stated specifically here:
    1. On Ends 2:9 : Cicero: "…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'" Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be."
    2. On Ends 2:11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible."
  7. This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure, and how he defines the absence of pain as the highest pleasure. He is not talking about the most intense stimulation, he is talking philosophically about the most pure and complete condition of pleasure where pleasure is defined as a condition where absolutely all pain is gone. The wise man is about to consider this condition to be the most complete pleasure even though it is not the most intense stimulation:
    1. On Ends 1:56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
    2. On Ends 1:62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool's life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
As to Pleasure being the guide of life:
1. Lucretius Book Two [167]:
  1. Munro: "But some in opposition to this, ignorant of matter, believe that nature cannot without the providence of the gods, in such nice conformity to the ways of men, vary the seasons of the year and bring forth crops, aye and all the other things, which divine pleasure, the guide of life, prompts men to approach, escorting them in person and enticing them by her fondlings to continue their races through the arts of Venus, that mankind may not come to an end."
  2. Rouse: "But some in opposition to this, knowing nothing of matter, believe that without the gods' power nature cannot with so exact conformity to the plans of mankind change the seasons of the year, and produce crops, and in a word all else which divine pleasure, the guide of life, persuades men to approach, herself leading them and coaxing them, through the ways of Venus, to beget their generations, that the human race may not come to an end."
  3. Humphries: "Some people do not know how matter works. They think that nature needs the will of the gods to fit the seasons of the year so nicely to human needs, to bring to birth the crops And other blessings, which our guide to life, the radiance of pleasure, makes us crave through Venus' agency."
2. Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus [129]:
  1. Bailey: [129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.
Notes: There is no higher good than pleasure, no greater evil than pain.
Discussion Forum

4.3.3. By "Pleasure" We Mean All Experience That Is Not Painful

The topic includes the Epicurean meaning of the word "Pleasure," in which the term "pleasure" is an exact equivalent and interchangeable with "Absence of Pain." We conclude this because there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and when we are not experiencing the one we are by definition experiencing the other. That means that if we are aware of our experience at all, what we are aware of is either Pleasure or Pain, and as a result there is no neutral or third or mixed state of awareness. We can of course be aware of any number of things simultaenously, but each discrete experience is viewable as either pleasurable or painful.

The topic also includes the Desirability of pleasure, why we sometimes choose pain and avoid pleasure, the relationship and relative ranking of mental vs. bodily pleasure and pain, the implications of the fact that pleasures differ In duration, intensity, and part of the body affected, the Quantitative "Limit" in total pleasure,

Under this topic we also discuss the complementary doctrine that Pain is undesirable, but that pain is manageable because if pain is intense it is generally short, if pain is long it is manageable, and if pain becomes for some reason unendurable, then pain can be escaped through death.

Major Implications:
Citations:
1. Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
2. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
3. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
4. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
5. On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: "…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'" Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be."
6. On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be." [Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. (Cic. Fin. 2.11)]
7. On Ends Book Two, 16 : "This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?"
8. Notes:
9. Discussion Forum:

4.3.4. Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time.

Epicurus held that Life is desirable, because it affords the opportunity for pleasure. However there are times when we will give our life for a friend, or we will accept death as the better alternative when living on would mean more pain than pleasure.

The observation that pleasure cannot be made more complete than complete (than when we experience nothing but pleasure without any adulteration of pain) leads us to realize that Infinite Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than A Limited Time. This is because while it is certainly true that pleasure is greater in duration when we live longer, pleasure cannot be made more complete than complete, and duration is not the only factor involved in measuring pleasure. Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus that the wise man at a banquet choose not the most food, but the best, and held that our desire should not be for the longest life, but the most pleasant. The determination of what is "most pleasant" is not an objective measurement, but instead must take into account all circumstances of life, including not only duration but also the intensity and part of the body affected by pleasure and pain. If we take Epicurus' advice to heart, we see that nothing can be made more complete than that which is complete, and that "variation" - or the continuous adding-on of new pleasurable experiences, cannot make our lives more complete any more than continuously adding water to a jar can make the jar hold more water.

Under this topic we discuss the nature of the best life, and the question of How Long Should We Seek To Live?

Major Implications: Life is generally desirable because it generally affords the opportunity for pleasure.
Citations:
1. PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.
2. Letter to Menoeceus 126: "And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well."
3. PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.
4. PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.
5. PD21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.
6. Notes:
7. Discussion Forum:

## Discussion Links

Each of the above topics is discussed at the following links at EpicureanFriends: